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1 Introduction 
Few topics spark the amount of immediate emotion that genocide does, both among 
scholars and the population in general. And understandably so; the idea of being harmed 
not because of who we are, or what we’ve done, but simply because we belong to a group 
someone else deem less worthy of life is contrary to every idea of human worth. Though 
genocide may have come to our collective minds through the gas chambers of Auschwitz, 
the killing fields of Cambodia and the Rwandan machete, the crime was not invented in the 
past century. Mass-slaughter of minorities has existed as long as humanity itself, and has so 
far seemed to be something we are unable, or unwilling, to banish from the world. It is with 
this in mind that the international community continues to struggle with the prevention and 
punishment of genocide. 
 
But the work of handling genocide is not helped by the chasm that seems to have opened 
up between the narrow, legal definition of the crime, and the much broader understanding 
of it in the popular mind. Several times in recent years these two conceptions have clashed, 
derailing the public discussion from the crimes happening on the ground, to whether or not 
to label them genocide. The widespread crimes that took place in the Darfur region of 
Sudan after 2003 give an example of such a clash and the consequences this chasm of 
conception can have. In his article ‘Calling Genocide by Its Rightful Name: Lemkin’s 
Word, Darfur and the UN Report’1, David Luban takes note of how the United Nations 
Darfur Report2, examining, among other things, whether or not the crimes in Darfur were 
genocide, was received in the media. The report tells in detail of the gruesome horrors the 
                                                
1 Luban, D., ’Calling Genocide by Its Rightful Name: Lemkin’s Word, Darfur, and the UN Report’, 
Chicago Journal of International Law, vol. 7, no. 1 (2006-2007) 
2 United Nations, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United 
Nations Secretary-General (2005) 
 2 
people of Darfur were put through, but it concludes that the crimes committed were not 
genocide, but crimes against humanity and war crimes. The report goes on to conclude that 
what happened on the ground in Darfur was just as evil, just as shocking and just as illegal 
as had been thought prior to their investigation, and the only reason they were not 
categorized as genocide was because the perpetrators lacked the motivation for the crime 
that is legally demanded.3 It was not certain that people were being killed only because 
they were a part of a protected group, or that they were part of a protected group, which are 
both requirements for a crime to be called genocide. Thus it ‘fell short of’ genocide, and 
was labelled extermination (a crime against humanity) and war crimes. No less severe, the 
Report said, no less evil; only with a different legal requirement. There is, they insisted, no 
hierarchy among international crimes. Genocide is not worse than extermination - it is 
different.  
 
But that was not what the media, and through them the world, heard. David Luban notes 
the headlines that appeared the day after the Darfur Report was released: ‘Murder, but no 
Genocide’4, ‘Horrors Short of Genocide’5, ‘UN Confusion as Sudan Conflict is No Longer 
Genocide’6. Given that this was not at all the impression the Report tried to leave, this 
reading of its conclusions had to have been damaging for whatever chances there were of 
the world interfering to stop the crimes in Darfur. And it was all, Luban claims, because the 
Commission made its point of how crimes against humanity in the form of extermination is 
just as serious as genocide in ‘a maddeningly legalistic manner’, which ‘vividly illustrates 
how disconnected the law of genocide has become from the generally accepted meaning of 
the word. To everyone in the world other than a handful of international lawyers, genocide 
is the “crime of crimes” …’7  
                                                
3 The Darfur Report, as summarized in Luban, ’Calling Genocide by Its Rightful Name’, 303-309 
4 ’Murder, but No Genocide’, Scotsman 25 (Feb 2, 2005), as quoted in Luban, ’Calling Genocide 
by Its Rightful Name’, 304 
5 ’Horrors Short of Genocide’, Herald Sun (Melbourne) 34 (Feb 2, 2005), as quoted in Luban, 
’Calling Genocide by Its Rightful Name’, 304 
6 Russel, A., ’UN Confusion as Sudan Conflict is No Longer ’Genocide’, Daily Telegraph (London) 
12 (Feb 2, 2005), as quoted in Luban, ’Calling Genocide by Its Rightful Name’, 304 
7 Luban, ’Calling Genocide by Its Rightful Name’, 306 
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The Darfur example shows something not to be ignored about genocide. The term has a 
powerful meaning. It brings with it weight and momentum, and is not used lightly. This is 
all, of course, as it should be, and undoubtedly as both its inventor Raphael Lemkin and the 
drafters of the Genocide Convention intended. But there is a downside to instilling a legal 
concept with such a powerful moral meaning and momentum: What happens when 
something ‘falls short’ of genocide? When the legal term and the popular term have parted 
ways in such a dramatic manner, there is a risk of very real atrocities being overlooked and 
downplayed in the public attention and, by extension, by the states and institutions that 
launch and fund such things as humanitarian interventions, international inquiries and 
international criminal tribunals.  
 
So what about the international legal order then? Are international legal scholars, judges 
and lawyers resting stubbornly in their ivory towers without meeting this challenge at all? 
Luckily, that is not the case. There is an almost constant outcry, both from lawyers and 
others, for changes to be made to the chief legal instrument concerning genocide: The 
Genocide Convention. Moreover, several scholars have in recent years suggested that one 
of the legal requirements that could be responsible for this conceptual divide is about to 
evolve. It has been suggested that the way in which international courts and tribunals 
determine the limits of the protected groups, and who is considered to be their members, is 
changing. From resting their decision on a group’s existence largely on factors considered 
to be objective, such as the racial heritage of victims, spoken language and shared territory, 
the court’s evaluation may now be based more on subjective perceptions, that is on how the 
perpetrators identify the group that they have singled out, or how the victims themselves 
view their own group status. If this is indeed the case, such a change in the interpretation of 
the Genocide Convention could help bring the legal concept of genocide closer to the 
popular concept, because it would no longer limit protection to the ‘objective’ limits of 
groups that to many seem arbitrary, and closer to the reality of the 1940s than the world as 
it is today.  
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In this thesis I will seek to shed some light on the nature, the reason for and the 
consequences of this conceptual divide between the narrow, legal concept of genocide and 
the broader popular understanding. I will be examining whether this challenge of 
conceptions is, in fact, being addressed by the Courts and Tribunals with jurisdiction over 
genocide by changing the criteria of group determination to broaden the legal concept of 
genocide, and if there are other ways this challenge should be met. I will, in conclusion, be 
contending that understanding genocide from a group-pluralist point of view is the means 
by which the conversation about mass atrocities should be cleared up.   
 
 5 
2 International Criminal Law as a Field of Law 
2.1 General Remarks 
International Criminal Law (ICL) is a branch of law sorting under the category Public 
International Law. As such, it has many of the characteristics belonging to Public 
International Law. The first feature worth noting is that it has grown out of, and within, a 
system of law without a central legislator. Unlike national legal systems, the international 
community as a whole has no central government to give its laws. As a community made 
up of self-governing and sovereign entities – the national states – it is entirely dependent on 
consent to inter-statal agreements to run its affairs8. A consequence of this is that treaties 
concluded between state parties will normally only bind those who have entered into the 
agreement9, either at the time of its conclusion or subsequently – as a general rule, there is 
no entity or set of rules endorsed with the authority to bind states that are not parties to the 
agreement without their consent.10  
 
Another general feature of public international law is that it only binds states. Individuals, 
NGOs or other non-state actors are affected by the agreements between states, they are 
actors on the international legal arena, but they are not treated as subjects of the law. This 
is, however, an area where ICL differs from public international law. ICL regulates 
individual criminal responsibility, as well as state responsibility. The branch as a whole 
grew out of the rules of state responsibility for international crimes (which is not a criminal 
responsibility, but more akin to a responsibility for breach of contract) and added 
responsibility for individuals, thus making individuals subjects under ICL. When it comes 
                                                
8 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), Article 6 
9 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 12 
10 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 34 
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to genocide, there is a dual regime of responsibility. The individual responsibility11 is 
supplemented by a state responsibility to ‘prevent and punish’ genocide12, meaning that 
when a genocide occurs, both the individual perpetrators and the state itself can in theory 
be held responsible (the state responsibility would involve reparations, while individual 
responsibility for genocide typically involves a prison sentence). Through the Genocide 
Convention and customary international law, states are responsible for both ex ante 
prevention, and ex post punishment13.  
 
The responsibility to prevent and to punish has been recognized as an obligation erga 
omnes, ‘which places on states a positive duty and is violated by omission’.14 Though this 
sounds like a tight regime of responsibility, the reality has usually not been nearly as 
efficient as the Convention envisions. Making the states responsible for failing to make the 
appropriate effort to prevent a genocide from happening has, perhaps not unsurprisingly, 
led to states being hesitant towards labelling a situation genocidal, because once that label 
is applied they risk the chance of neglecting their international responsibilities if they fail to 
act. Referring to the genocide in the Former Yugoslavia, commentator Thomas Weiss 
noted that ‘the Clinton administration, for instance, dared not use the "G" word which 
would have implied the necessity to act.15’ Though frustrating, this is a direct consequence 
of having a system of sovereign states to govern the international community. If 
sovereignty is to be respected, one is at the mercy of the goodwill of the states when 
decisions are to be made, and states do not always have applying the correct legal term to a 
situation as their main motivation for their actions.  
 
                                                
11 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948), Article 4 
12 ICJ Judgement, ’Case Concerning the Application of the Covnention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro)’, February 2007, as referenced in Ben-Naftali, O., ’The Obligation to Prevent and to 
Punish Genocide’ in ’The UN Genocide Convention: A Commentary’ by Gaeta, P. (ed.) (Oxford, 
2009), 350 
13 Ben-Naftali, ’The Obligation to Prevent and to Punish Genocide’, 28 
14 Ben-Naftali, ’The Obligation to Prevent and to Punish Genocide’, 36, see notes 37 and 38 
15 Weiss, T., ’Humanitarian Intervention: Ideas in Action’ (Cambridge, 2007), 54 
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Furthermore, the same lack of central authority that exists on the legislative side of the 
matter is also present when it comes to sanctioning breaches of international law. Though 
several courts and tribunals with jurisdiction over international crimes have been set up in 
recent years, they do not, as of yet, have compulsory jurisdiction. Third-party jurisdiction 
might affect this situation to a point, but that is not something I will be treating in this 
thesis. When genocide cases are raised before international courts or tribunals, sanctioning 
can be a challenge. The perpetrators need to be apprehended and brought before a tribunal, 
which in many cases is not at all uncomplicated. Territorial sovereignty can be a hindrance, 
and even if the world community was willing to cross that boundary, it is not immediately 
apparent who would take care of the practicalities of an operation to apprehend an 
unwilling perpetrator hiding in either his home state or a third party state.  
 
In short: ICL and genocide law suffer from many of the same deficiencies as other areas of 
Public International Law. States have to comply or cooperate to get the matter on the 
agenda in the United Nations Security Council, to stop the atrocities, to get the criminals 
under control and to make sure they are being tried for their crimes. The area is under 
development, for sure, but these are still features that affect the field, and that need to be 
remembered if genocide is to be discussed on a theoretical level without losing touch with 
the realities of the international legal and political reality.   
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2.2 Sources in International Criminal Law 
What sources one is to rely on when interpreting a question of ICL is codified in the 
Statutes of the International Court of Justice, article 38(1): 
 
’The Court, whose function it is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as 
are submitted to it, shall apply: 
a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly 
recognized by the contesting States; 
b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
c) the general principles of law recognized by civilised nations; 
d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the 
most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law.’ 
 
I will refrain from entering into a general analysis of the meaning of Article 38(1), but will 
instead tie my comments directly to how these rules work in connection to the field of ICL 
in general, and genocide in particular.  
 
2.2.1 International Conventions 
There is an international convention regulating genocide as a crime; the UN Genocide 
Convention. The interpretation of treaty rules is regulated by the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, which is held to codify customary law on the matter. It states that any rule 
is to be interpreted ’in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to 
the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose16’. I will 
return to what this provision entails for Article 2 in the Genocide Convention in Chapter 3.  
 
I will also be referencing the statutes of various courts and tribunals; the International 
Criminal Court (ICC), the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for 
                                                
16 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 31 (1) 
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Rwanda (ICTR), and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC). 
These statutes do not have a general scope. They only directly regulate the tribunals they 
were written to bind. Resolutions to adopt the Statutes of the ICTR and the ICTY were 
passed by the United Nations Security Council ‘on the strength of Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter’, and are as such ‘legally binding on all UN member states pursuant to Article 25 
of the UN Charter.’17 But many of the rules in these statutes are held to reflect customary 
law, and when they do, the relevant rules are binding on all states, whether they are 
signatories or not18. However, it is important to keep in mind that it cannot be assumed that 
all the rules in the statutes reflect customary law, and thus have a general scope, and that 
they automatically are an exact reflection of the customary rule.  
 
2.2.2 International Custom 
International custom are unwritten rules that states obey in the belief that they are, in fact, 
rules that they are bound by. The existence of such rules can be deduced from state practice 
– that is, the actions and positions of states – and this practice has to be widespread and 
firm if it is to amount to a customary rule. Unlike treaty rules, customary rules are binding 
on all states, without the need for any expressed consent19. Customary rules are often 
codified in treaties, but the fact that treaty rules regulating the matter exist is not enough to 
conclude that there are not also customary rules in operation. Treaty rules are not numerous 
in the field of ICL, and even where rules are codified in treaties, such as is the case with the 
Genocide Convention, there are many interpretative questions left unanswered. In these 
cases, customary rules can be necessary to clarify or to fill in gaps left by treaty rules, or 
for ‘pinpointing general principles of criminal law, whenever the application of such 
principles becomes necessary …’ 20 
 
                                                
17 Cassese, A., ’International Criminal Law’, (Oxford, 2008), 15; referencing the Charter of the 
United Nations (1945), Article 25 
18 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 38 
19 Ruud, M. and Ulfstein, G., ’Innføring i folkerett’ (Oslo, 2006), 79 
20 Cassese, ’International Criminal Law’, 17  
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Whether or not the Genocide Convention is an exhaustive codification of the prohibition on 
genocide, thereby making the relevant provisions in the Convention the relevant rule to 
analyse, is something I will tackle in Chapter 3.  
 
2.2.3 General Principles of Law Recognised by Civilised Nations 
When including ’general principles of law recognised by civilised nations’ as a relevant 
source of international law, the idea is to capture legal rules that are shared by a large 
portion of national legal systems. This might seem an illogical inclusion to the very 
positivistic type of legal system the international legal order usually is. If the national states 
wanted these rules to regulate their dealings with each other on the international level, then 
surely they would have expressed that will in an international treaty? But keeping in mind 
the practicalities of international politics, the necessity of this source of law becomes more 
apparent. Treaty negotiations are time consuming and politically challenging, and it takes 
time to build up a body of law comprehensive enough to tackle the many legal questions 
that arise on the international arena. International Criminal Law is, at the moment at least, 
an underdeveloped and rudimentary branch of law.21 Until it has matured as a legal field, 
answers can be sought by looking to principles recognised in national legal systems. In 
addition, it is a reasonable presumption that states would agree to solve questions of 
international law the same way they are solving these questions nationally. Exactly how 
many national legal systems would have to share a principle for it to be taken into 
consideration as a source of international law is unclear, but it is certain that it needn’t be 
all national legal systems22. Despite the wording in Article 38(1), the courts do not 
distinguish between ‘civilised’ and ‘non-civilised’ nations23 – it is a distinction without 
meaning in today’s international law. 
 
There are many general principles of law that have reached the international level from 
national criminal law, but I will restrict myself to commenting on one that is of direct 
                                                
21 Cassese, ’International Criminal Law’, 4  
22 Ruud and Ulfstein, ’Innføring i folkerett’, 81  
23 Ruud and Ulfstein, ’Innføring i folkerett’, 81  
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importance to the interpretation of the rules on genocide treated in this thesis. That is the 
nullem crimen, sine lege principle; no crime where there is no law (meaning rule, as 
opposed to written law). This limits the interpretative space in areas where one could in 
effect expand the area of criminal responsibility by choosing one interpretation over 
another, meaning it is a principle one needs to be mindful of when working with ICL.  
 
I will be commenting on how the prohibition on genocide is implemented in national legal 
systems in Chapter 3.  
 
2.2.4 Judicial Decisions 
The judicial decisions most relevant to the interpretation of genocide law come from the 
international courts and tribunals that have jurisdiction over the crime. In principle, judicial 
decisions from national courts can also be used to deduce the exact content of international 
legal rules, but in practice they aren’t referenced as often because they are not as easily 
obtainable as the judgements of the international courts. Judicial decisions, though a 
subsidiary source of law, are a useful source of information. As distinguished ICL scholar 
Antonio Cassese points out, ‘given the characteristics of ICL one should set great store by 
national or international judicial decisions. They may prove of crucial importance, not only 
for ascertaining whether a customary rule has evolved, but also as means to establish the 
most appropriate interpretation to be placed on a treaty rule.’24 
 
The courts with the most comprehensive case law on genocide are the international 
tribunals set up to handle the cases stemming from the genocide in the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia and in Rwanda; the ICTY and the ICTR. The International Criminal Court 
(ICC) also has jurisdiction over the crime, but seeing as it was established as late as in 
2002, its jurisprudence is not yet as expansive as the two tribunals.  
 
                                                
24 Cassese, ’International Criminal Law’, 27  
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In this thesis, I will be examining judgements from the ICTR and the ICTY. It is important 
to take note of the characteristics of international courts that differ from courts in national 
legal systems. First and foremost, judicial decisions have no general scope. Article 38.1 (d) 
references Article 59 in the Statue, which states that the Court’s decision is only binding on 
the parties to the case, in respect of that particular case. But that is not to say that 
judgements have no value outside of this very narrow context. They are not formally 
binding on anyone else, but this does of course not affect the argumentative value of the 
solutions chosen in the judgement.  
 
In addition, there is no hierarchy between courts in the international legal system, and the 
different Trial Chambers in each case do not bind other Trial Chambers to the same 
interpretations and judicial solutions that they choose (In other words, judicial decisions are 
not formally precedents. An exception is, of course, the relationship between a Trial 
Chamber and an Appeal Chamber in the very same case. Here, the latter’s decision would 
be binding on the former25). As a consequence, it cannot automatically be assumed that the 
most recent judgements reflect the status of the law when differing from solutions chosen 
in past judgements. The fact that there is no ‘international supreme court’ to authoritatively 
settle a question of conflicting interpretations, is a difference from national legal systems 
that is worth noting. But that is not to say that the various courts do not look to each other’s 
work when dealing with similar questions of law. Naturally, they do; forseeability and 
coherence are general principles of law that are important on the international level as well 
as in national legal systems. Practice shows that the courts do, in fact, rely on its own case 
law26. This practice makes the case law stemming from the various courts and tribunals a 
much better source of information – over time their jurisprudence can evolve to fill legal 
gaps left open by treaty and customary law.  
 
                                                
25 Cassese, ’International Criminal Law’, 27 
26 Ruud and Ulfstein, ’Innføring i folkerett’, 81  
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2.2.5 Legal Literature (‘the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the 
various nations’) 
As already stated, ICL is a rudimentary branch of law, and its rules are often fragmented 
and lacking in coherence. The courts focus their attention on the matters that are raised 
before them, and what issues the states put on the agenda for discussion and treaty 
negotiations is often a matter of political feasibility, instead of being a matter of filling in 
legal gaps. Coherence and overview is easier to establish in legal literature. Allowing for 
the works of ‘the most highly qualified publicists’ to count as a source of law, is a way of 
making sure that the courts actually have something to rely on when the primary sources 
offer insufficient guidance.  
 
As judicial decisions, legal literature is a subsidiary source of law. As a result, the courts 
will rarely let themselves be bound by opinions in literature. But in practice, arguments 
developed in legal literature can be very influential.27 Scholars have the opportunity to give 
an overview of the state of the law on a matter much more comprehensively than the courts 
themselves normally have reason to do, and their arguments will therefore have a 
coherence that give them argumentative force. Where a point of view is shared among the 
distinguished legal scholars of the world, that argumentative force carries a distinct weight.  
 
Some of the scholars whose works and thoughts I draw upon in this thesis, I use in the 
capacity of source of law according to Article 38.1 (d) of the ICJ Statute. I consider the 
works of these scholars that I use in this way to meet the criteria ‘the teachings of the most 
highly qualified publicists of the various nations’.  
 
Antonio Cassese was President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia from 1993-1997, Chairperson for the International Commission of Inquiry on 
Darfur (which issued the ‘Darfur Report’), is currently President of the Special Tribunal for 
                                                
27 Ruud and Ulfstein, ’Innføring i folkerett’, 82  
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Lebanon, and has, in addition, written two textbooks widely used and referenced in legal 
teachings, titled ‘International Law, and International Criminal Law’.28  
 
William Schabas is a professor of international law at the National University of Ireland, 
and has served as President of the ‘International Association of Genocide Scholars’ (a 
’global, interdisciplinary, non-partisan organization that seeks to further research and 
teaching about the nature, causes, and consequences of genocide, and advance policy 
studies on prevention of genocide.’29) since 2009. He was also a member of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone. Schabas has authored a substantial amount of 
books and articles dealing with questions of genocide, international criminal law, 
international human rights law and public international law, several of which are being 
widely cited in their respective fields.30  
 
Geir Ulfstein is a professor of international law at the University of Oslo and the former 
director of the Norwegian Center for Human Rights. Morten Ruud is a jurist and was a civil 
servant in the Norwegian Ministry of Justice and the Police. Their book ‘Innføring i 
folkerett’, or ‘Introduction to Public International Law’ (my translation) is used by all of 
the Norwegian universities with a master programme in law, and thus has a widespread and 
substantial influence. 
 
2.2.6 General Remarks on the Sources Relevant to Genocide 
There is a convention regulating the prohibition on genocide, but it leaves quite a few 
interpretative gaps. One of those gaps is subject to analysis in this thesis; the determination 
of the groups that are protected from genocide. There is, as I will show later on in this 
thesis, little help to be found in the Convention when trying to settle the question of group 
membership. This lack of material from the primary sources recognised in the ICJ Statute 
                                                
28 Antonio Cassese’s Curriculum Vitae at the ICTY, http://www.icty.org/sid/155#Cassese  
29 Genocide Scholars, http://www.genocidescholars.org/about-us/ (viewed at 25.04.11) 
30 William Schabas’ Curriculum Vitae at the National University of Ireland, Galway, http://www.nuigalway.ie/human_rights/documents/cv_schabas.4.09.pdf  
 15 
means that there is a need to look to the subsidiary sources for practical guidance. In effect, 
when the sources instilled with authority give little or no actual guidance, ‘lightweight’ 
sources like judicial decisions and legal literature are given greater importance.  
 16 
3 The Prohibition on Genocide 
3.1 Background 
The term ‘genocide’ was coined by the Polish jurist Raphael Lemkin in the early 1940s. He 
put together the Greek word for tribe, genos, and the Latin word for killing, -cide, to create 
a word to cover the atrocities towards peoples that he had witnessed in his lifetime. 
Lemkin’s idea of genocide, as set out in his seminal work ‘Axis Rule of Occupied 
Europe’31, was much broader than the idea of genocide that was later converted into law. It 
encompassed such concepts as cultural genocide, economic genocide and political 
genocide, which are not types of genocide recognised in the much narrower legal definition 
of the term that followed.  
 
What was important to Lemkin about genocide was the idea of protecting group plurality in 
itself. Genocide as a crime, for Lemkin, was different from crimes such as murder and 
extermination in that it attacked the very idea of group plurality in an effort to wipe out not 
only individuals, but human collectives that would otherwise be able to contribute to 
humanity in their own specific way:  
 
‘Nations are essential elements of the world community. The world represents only so much 
culture and intellectual vigour as are created by its component national groups. Essentially the 
idea of a nation signifies constructive cooperation and original contributions, based upon 
genuine traditions, genuine culture, and a well-developed national psychology. The destruction 
of a nature, therefore, results in the loss of its future contributions to the world.’32 
 
                                                
31 Lemkin, R., ’Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation – Analysis of Government – 
Proposals for Redress’, (Washington D.C., 1944) 
32 Lemkin, ’Axis Rule in Occupied Europe’, 91 
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Individuals are thus, to the definition of genocide, not important in themselves. Though any 
act of genocide would naturally have to be committed against individuals, they are only 
important insofar as they are members of such groups that make up the ‘family of man’. As 
David Luban so elegantly puts it, ‘groups represent ways of life, imaginative visions of the 
good worked out collectively over the course of generations. They represent the many 
forms of human sociality and, in important respects, of human transcendence of our finite 
individuality. For that reason, to annihilate a group is a crime that diminishes humanity 
over and above the loss of the slaughtered individuals.’33 
 
Lemkin’s idea of genocide was over the course of only a few years crystallized into a legal 
text; The United Nations ‘Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide’ (after this the ‘Genocide Convention’ or the ‘Convention’).  The definition of 
the crime is set out in Article 2 of the Convention, and summed up by legal scholar 
Antonio Cassese like this: ‘Genocide is the intentional destruction, through one of five 
well-specified categories of conduct, of one of some groups as such (national, ethnical, 
racial or religious) or of members of one of these groups as such.’34 So genocide is, in 
essence, the crime of destroying or trying to destroy a specific group, just because they are 
that specific group. The drafters of the Conventions stayed close to Lemkin’s idea of 
protecting group pluralism when they devised the two main features that make the crime of 
genocide what it is, and separates it from other atrocity crimes such as crimes against 
humanity: the special intent that is required, and the requirement that the victims belong to, 
and indeed are being chosen for belonging to, one of the four protected groups35.  
 
The Convention was adopted by the states of the world very quickly through the United 
Nations General Assembly, and as recently as in 1948. But genocide, though coined as a 
term and criminalized in our lifetime, is not a new crime. In 1948, the international 
community unequivocally stated that genocide is a crime under international law, but 
                                                
33 Luban, ’Calling Genocide by Its Rightful Name’, 309 
34 Cassese, International Criminal Law’, 127 
35 Luban, ’Calling Genocide by Its Rightful Name’, 310 
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conduct that we now recognize as genocide had been illegal before the adoption of the 
Convention as well. The Charter of the International Military Tribunal (IMT), which tried 
Nazi leaders for their crimes committed during World War II, ‘used a wording (‘murder, 
extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any 
civilian population’ and ‘persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds’) that 
encompassed large-scale massacres of ethnic, racial or religious groups.’36 But with the 
1948 Convention, genocide was for the first time recognized as its own category of crime, 
separate from crimes against humanity. It was the first time the international community of 
states considered genocide as a separate class of crime, and promised to ‘prevent and to 
punish37’ it, should it ever occur again. 
 
The prohibition on genocide is held to be a peremptory norm under international law38 
(also known as a jus cogens norm), meaning that it is a norm accepted and supported by the 
community of states, and a norm by which all states are bound and from which no 
derogation is allowed. Any rule, whether its origin is a treaty or customary law, not in 
keeping with a peremptory norm is thus void and invalid, unless that rule itself represents a 
new peremptory norm39. When examining the prohibition on genocide, the Genocide 
Convention is the natural place to start. Its definition of the crime enjoys widespread 
acceptance among states as a codification of the jus cogens prohibition on genocide, which 
is further evidenced by the fact that its meaning and wording is repeated in the statutes of 
the central courts and tribunals that have jurisdiction over genocide as a crime. This makes 
the Convention the legal and the practical authority on the matter. Article 2 in the 
Convention, which sets out the central definition and deals with the protected groups, is 
repeated practically word for word in the statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR)40, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
                                                
36 Cassese, ’International Criminal Law’, 127 
37 Genocide Convention, Article 1 
38 Ben-Naftali, ’The Obligations to Prevent and to Punish Genocide’, 36, see note 36 39 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 53  
40 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (1994), Article 2 
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(ICTY)41, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC)42 and the 
International Criminal Court (ICC)43.  
 
There aren’t many exceptions from the wording chosen in the Convention in national 
legislation implementing the prohibition on genocide, but they do exist. Notable examples 
are the French criminal code44 and the criminal code of Burkina Faso, which go 
considerably further in the groups they offer protection to than the Convention does (a 
group determined by any arbitrary criteria, thus implementing a purely subjective view on 
group identification). The Canadian prohibition on genocide protects ‘an identifiable group 
of persons’, widening the scope even further, and there are also a few examples of criminal 
laws that include political and social groups into their protected groups45. However, these 
exceptions are not nearly widespread enough to represent a customary norm replacing the 
Convention’s Article 2, which is rarely departed from, and thus it seems clear that Article 2 
is indeed what needs to be tackled when it comes to determining the exact nature of the 
group protection from genocide. 
 
                                                
41 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (1993), Article 4 
42 Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the 
Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea (2004), Article 4 
43 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998), Article 6 
44 Penal Code (France), Journal Officiel, July 23, 1992, art. 211-1 
45 The Penal Code of Burkina Faso, Article 313; The Canadian Crimes Against Humanity and War 
Crimes Act, subsection 4(3); the Ethiopian Penal Code, Article 281; the Peruvian Penal Code, 
Article 319; all referenced in Martin, F., ’The Notion of ’Protected Group’ in the Genocide 
Convention and its Application’ in ’The UN Genocide Convention: A Commentary’ by Gaeda, P. 
(ed.), 113-114 
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3.2 Protected Groups in the Genocide Convention 
Article 2 in the Genocide Convention reads as follows:  
 
‘In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: 
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical 
destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.’46 
 
Article 2 makes it abundantly clear that the protected groups are central to the concept of 
genocide. Indeed, it’s not possible to commit genocide if ones criminal behavior is not 
directed towards a group protected by the Convention; ‘the existence of the ‘group’ is the 
protected value that justifies criminalization and makes genocide a crime of special 
intent’.47 The four groups that are protected are national groups, ethnical groups, racial 
groups and religious groups. This list is exhaustive, and there is not at this time any 
agreement in the international legal community on definitions of the four categories. Given 
the importance of these groups to the concept of genocide, it is striking that the drafters of 
the Convention chose only to enumerate these four, arguably relatively vague, categories, 
and left the drawing of more precise lines of protection to subsequent interpreters. William 
Schabas suggests that the possible explanation for this might be that the meaning of the 
terms chosen, or at least the core of the protection, was fairly clear to the drafters, who 
didn’t find these terms nearly as vague or outdated as they might appear to a 21st century 
reader48.  
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Be that as it may, for a modern reader, the place to start interpretation of any treaty is with 
the ‘ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light 
of its object and purpose’49, as stated in the Vienna Convention on Treaty Law. This 
interpretative rule is ‘declaratory of customary international law on the construction of both 
treaties and, arguably, other written rules as well’50, and can thus authoritatively be relied 
on to govern the interpretation of the Genocide Convention, even though the Convention 
itself does not reference the rule. The Vienna Convention also sets out what ‘context’ 
means for the sake of interpretation. Most important is the rest of the Convention, including 
the preamble and annexes. If there were any agreements relating to the treaty made 
between the parties, or agreed to by the parties, at the time of the treaty conclusion, this too 
counts as context. In addition, any subsequent agreement between the parties on how the 
Convention should be interpreted would also be taken into account. With regards to Article 
2, there is no other agreement between the parties, neither entered into at the time of the 
treaty conclusion or afterwards, that can be of assistance when one is to draw the lines of 
the protected groups.  
 
Scholars of international law have suggested different methods for understanding Article 2. 
The most common approach is to tackle each of the four categories in turn in an effort to 
pin down the exact meaning of each term51. This seems to be the method favoured by the 
ICTR52 and the ICTY as well, though they do not always feel bound to place the group in 
question in the case before them into a specific protected group53. Others claim this 
delimitation is not in keeping with the object and purpose of the Convention. Several of the 
                                                                                                                                               
Recent Developments in the Law of Genocide’ in Rutgers Law Review, vol. 61, no. 1 (2008-2009), 
167  
49 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 31.1 
50 Cassese, ’International Criminal Law’, 17  
51 Cassese, ’International Criminal Law’, 138; Kress, C., ’The Crime of Genocide under 
International Law’ in International Criminal Law Review vol. 6 (2006), 476-479; Nersessian, D., 
’The Razor’s Edge: Defining and Protecting Human Groups Under the Genocide Convention’ in 
Cornell International Law Journal, vol. 26 (2003-2004), 299-304 
52 ICTR Judgement, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Trial Chamber, 2 September 1998, §512-515 
53 ICTY Judgement, Prosecutor v. Krstic, Trial Chamber, 2 August 2001 
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categories are overlapping, and William Schabas sees this as evidence that what the 
categories are meant to be are ‘four corner posts that delimit an area within which a myriad 
of groups covered by the Genocide Convention find protection. … The drafters viewed the 
four groups in a dynamic and synergistic relationship, each contributing to an 
understanding of the meaning of the other.’54 Schabas goes even further, and suggests that 
pinning down the exact meaning would not only be fruitless, but would risk distorting the 
sense that comes from seeing the four terms as a whole. He receives some support for his 
view from the ICTY Trial Chamber in the Krstic case: 
 
‘The preparatory work of the Convention shows that setting out such a list was designed more 
to describe a single phenomenon, roughly corresponding to what was recognized, before the 
second world war, as national minorities, rather than to refer to several distinct prototypes of 
human groups. To attempt to differentiate between each of the named groups on the basis of 
scientifically objective criteria would thus be inconsistent with the object and purpose of the 
Convention’55 
 
This approach is alluring for several reasons. The task of setting out exact boundaries for 
terms so vague as the ones used in the Convention can be a frustrating and pedantic one. In 
addition, the intentions behind the protection of groups, the reason why genocide is a 
separate crime in the first place, are similar for all the four categories, making judging them 
in relation to each other a sensible approach. What was meant to be protected were groups 
that had a permanence and stability to them, that were not in flux, and whose members 
could not easily step outside of the group by choice. This was highlighted by the ICTR 
already in Akayesu56, which was the first time the tribual addressed genocide. In Akayesu, 
the Trial Chamber referred to the discussions in the Sixth Committee57 during the drafting 
of the Convention:  
 
                                                
54 Schabas, ’Genocide Law in a Time of Transition’, 167 
55 ICTY Judgement, ’Krstic’, Trial Chamber §556 
56 ICTR Judgement, ’Akayesu’, Trial Chamber §701 
57 The Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, meeting 21 September – 10 December 1948 
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‘the crime of genocide was allegedly perceived as targeting only ‘stable’ groups, constituted in 
a permanent fashion and membership of which is determined by birth, with the exclusion of 
more ‘mobile’ groups which one joins through individual voluntary commitment, such as 
political and economic groups. Therefore, a common criterion in the four types of groups 
protected by the Genocide Convention is that membership in such groups would seem to be 
normally not challengeable by its members, who belong to it automatically, by birth, in a 
continuous and often irremediable manner.’58   
 
And finally, the ‘corner post’ approach captures something not so easily put into exact 
words, lying at the heart of the Convention. At the time it was written, there was 
undeniably a certain sense of ‘you know what we mean’ connected to the choosing of the 
four groups. The list, as Schabas points out, was according to the preparatory work meant 
to correspond to the 1940s understanding of ‘national minorities’. This, with the knowledge 
of what scenario and moral momentum the Convention was born out of, leaves a fairly 
precise idea of what lies at the core of the protective regime. ‘Applied with a mix of 
common sense and intuition, the definition seems to work,’ Schabas concludes59. And he 
might have a point when he claims that the sense of this core might be lost if the terms are 
being interpreted autonomously, leaving interpretative room for ‘attempts to stretch the 
Genocide Convention definition, often going beyond all reason, in order to fit particular 
atrocities within the meaning of Article 2.60’  
 
However, the preparatory works should not be relied on unless the ordinary meaning of the 
terms in the text leaves the meaning of the rule ambiguous or obscure, or leads to ‘a result 
which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable’61. The terms racial, national, ethnical and 
religious might be vague, but they are not exceptionally unclear compared to other terms 
used in international law. And, as Claus Kress protests, even if we do let the preparatory 
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works guide us to a certain extent, this interpretation of the four categories is ‘hardly 
reconcilable with the internationally recognized rule of interpretation that each word used 
in a legal text carries its distinct meaning.’62 The way the four categories are set out, 
enumerated and exhaustive, does not suggest that they were not meant to be at all 
differentiated from one another. If the drafters had meant otherwise, they would 
presumably have made that clearer. It seems the most sensible approach would be to bring 
in the best of both points of view: The core of each separate term can be set out without too 
much difficulty, and when the boundaries needs to be drawn in a specific case, one should 
keep in mind that the four categories do to a certain extent overlap, and should be 
interpreted in relation to one another.  
 
3.2.1 National Groups 
A national group is a group that shares the same nationality63. This could in theory be the 
entire population of a state, say Italians as a national group, but it could also be a national 
minority within a state, like Italian-Americans in the USA, or French nationals of Algerian 
decent. The ICTR has defined a national group as ‘a collection of people who are perceived 
to share a common legal bond based on common citizenship, coupled with reciprocity of 
rights and duties’.64 The phrasing gives the impression that the members of the group all 
need to be citizens of the same state. It is, however, clear that this is not the case. But the 
formulation makes two things clear: Group members can’t themselves decide what 
nationality they have based on personal opinion, and ‘the tribunal’s focus on the legal 
aspects of nationality (on “rights and duties” and “a common legal bond”) makes clear that 
a collection of individuals organized on the basis of political beliefs is insufficient to 
constitute a national ‘group’ under the Convention without some additional legal interest 
tying them together’65. The focus on the legal aspects should however not lead one to 
conclude that the goal is to establish nationality instead of membership in a national group. 
                                                
62 Kress, ’The Crime of Genocide under International Law’, 475 
63 ICTR Judgement, Akayesu, §512-515; see also Cassese, ’International Criminal Law’, 138 
64 ICTR Judgement, Akayesu, §512 
65 Nersessian, ’The Razor’s Edge’, 302-302 
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The discussion in the Sixth Committee can shed some light on the distinction. The United 
Kingdom questioned including national groups in the Convention because people have a 
fundamental right to change their nationality, and the group would thus not adhere to the 
‘stable and permanent’ standard. The reply from the Egyptian delegate pointed to the ‘well-
known problem of the German minorities in Poland or of the Polish minority in Germany’, 
which showed that the ‘idea of the national group was perfectly clear’.66 The point being 
made was, of course, that though people have a right to change their nationality, they might 
still be perceived as part of the same national group by the perpetrators of genocide and the 
community in general, thus making the idea of the national group fundamentally different 
from the question of legal citizenship. 
 
3.2.2 Ethnic Groups 
Ethnicity is a term that will in many cases overlap with nationality or with race, and it is 
also the term that is the hardest to give a precise definition of. The question of ethnicity has 
given the international community very troublesome cases of interpretation both with 
regards to Rwanda and to Darfur, where the victim groups were hard to separate from the 
perpetrators in a manner that would bring them under the protection of the Convention. It is 
a term without a clear definition, and as such it is probable that it will continue to raise 
troublesome issues of interpretation in the future. In Akayesu, the ICTR defined an ethnical 
group as a group that shares a common language or culture67. Though overlapping to a 
certain extent with the other groups listed in Article 2, ethnicity is understood to have a 
meaning outside of the concept of nationality, and also of that of race. One who tried to 
formulate a distinction between them was Doudou Thiam, Special Rapporteur to the UN, 
who is quoted by ICL scholar David Nersessian: 
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‘The difference between the terms ‘ethnic’ and ‘racial’ is perhaps harder to grasp. It seems that 
the ethnic bond is more cultural. It is based on cultural values and is characterized by a way of 
life, a way of thinking and the same way of looking at life and things. On a deeper level, the 
ethnic group is based on a cosmogony.'68 
 
3.2.3 Racial Groups 
Race is no longer a term used in the social sciences, but it does nonetheless have a meaning 
in the Genocide Convention. In contrast to ethnicity, race is determined by physical 
characteristic. The ICTR’s definition of race is based on ‘hereditary physical traits often 
associated with a geographical region, irrespective of linguistic, cultural, national or 
religious factors.’69 While the concept of race is outdated, it’s definition does bring us very 
close to the idea of protection that the Convention was built upon. As Claus Kress reflects, 
‘an individual cannot escape from the racial group as so defined, and this understanding 
therefore reflects most directly the idea of the specific vulnerability of the group 
members.’70 However, it is a term that invokes a lot of discomfort, which might explain 
why the ICTR chose to label the Rwandan Tutsis as an ethnic group instead of a racial 
group71. 
 
3.2.4 Religious Groups 
On the face of it, religious groups would seem to be the groups easiest to identify. Their 
inclusion into the Convention was controversial in the Sixth Committee, because a 
religious group will often have voluntary membership72. Although this is generally the 
case, this point should not be stretched too far. Though membership in a religious group 
might be voluntary in general, it might not be in the time leading up to a genocide, when 
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the perpetrators usually are the ones who determine whether or not a potential victim is a 
group member or not.  
 
In Akayesu, the ICTR said that religious groups are groups whose members ‘share the same 
religion, denomination or mode of worship.73 It is obvious that the definition covers more 
than the ‘traditional’ religions that come to mind when the term is used in everyday life, but 
exactly how far one can stretch the concept of religion is unclear. Are for example atheists 
as a group protected by the Convention? What about believers in philosophies that are 
spiritual more than religious? Opinions vary as to whether or not such groups should be 
covered by the Convention’s definition, with some focusing on that these groups too often 
share a common mode of worship (or in the case of atheists, a lack thereof) and that 
including them ‘accords with the general trend of international thought on the issue.’74 This 
is debunked by others, who claim that while that might be the trend in international human 
rights law, it cannot simply be transferred to an area of criminal law, where it would in 
effect widen the perpetrator’s area of responsibility75. The question has not yet been put to 
the test in front of a court or tribunal. The cases set to come up before the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) in the coming years might shed some light 
on the issue of religious groups, as both the crimes committed against the Buddhist monks 
and the Muslim Cham in Cambodia might conceivably give the Court an opportunity to 
give its opinion on the matter.  
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4 Determining Group Membership: The Debate on Subjective and Objective 
Criteria of Identification – A Bridge Between Conceptions? 
4.1 Overview of the Debate 
When it has been decided whether or not a protected group exists in whatever case is being 
tried, the question of how to determine what individuals belong to that group remains. This 
has been framed as a question of whether to rely on objective or subjective factors when 
determining group membership.  
 
The so-called objective factors are factors such as the racial heritage of the victims, 
citizenship status as determined by national laws, or other factors that exist outside of the 
victims and the perpetrators own perception of group status. The determination of objective 
factors can be ‘informed by, for example, expert testimony from anthropologists, 
historians, and religious scholars, evidence form knowledgeable ‘outsiders’ (i.e., former 
colonial rulers), testimony from legal scholars on the citizenship law of a particular 
nationality, and other similar sources.’76  
 
Subjective perceptions, on the other hand, are mainly how the victims, the perpetrators and 
society in general consider the question of group membership. By a purely subjective 
approach to determining group membership, these opinions would be decisive. As David 
Nersessian points out, it is especially the perpetrator’s opinion that is important as a 
subjective factor, because ‘the genocidist’s mental state toward the group is the critical 
element: it distinguishes genocide from murder’.77 The victim’s perception of his or her 
own status as a group member might not be significant at all when individuals are being 
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singled out for slaughter. It was the Nazis, and the Nazis alone, who set out the rules that 
decided who counted as Jewish78. That the persons singled out for extermination did not at 
all think of themselves as Jewish, would not save them from the gas chambers. 
 
The supporters of the differing approaches are quick to warn of the dangers of choosing the 
opposing method. The objective approach has been criticized for relying on a legal fiction – 
no factors are really objective, they are social constructs. ‘Given the integral social 
dynamic of any group and the context-specific nature of this form of human organization, 
the ‘holy grail’ of a real objective group is usually a legal fiction’.79 Those who favour a 
subjective approach emphasize its advantages in being able to capture a larger variety of 
groups. Often the perpetrator’s perception of a group will not fully coincide with the group 
as it ‘really’ (objectively) is. During the Holocaust, people with little or no feeling of 
Jewish identity were still labelled Jewish and exterminated because the Nazi’s perception 
Jewish identity was different from the ‘objective’ reality. And thus some scholars argue 
that without a subjective approach, the aims and objectives of the Convention, in this case 
the objective of punishing the perpetrator’s malicious intent, cannot be fulfilled.80 
 
But the subjective approach has in turn been criticized for, when fully utilized, essentially 
missing the point of genocide as a crime that attacks groups and thus leads to an 
impoverishment of the human condition. If these groups are not real groups, that 
objectively have something in common that they offer humanity, then they do as such not 
constitute a unique group in the ‘family of man’.81 Such a conception of genocide would 
lose ‘sight of the crime’s purpose of addressing the destruction of real collectivities as 
opposed to simply addressing indiscriminate terror’.82 A purely subjective approach would 
stand the risk of severing the connection between genocide and pre-existing groups, which 
is essential to the concept of genocide.  
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4.2 The Genocide Convention and Group Identification 
The Convention itself is not clear on exactly how the question of group membership is to 
be settled. Some have claimed that the wording chosen in Article 2 is based on an 
understanding of groups as objective, and that it does not, on the face of it, support a 
subjective approach to determining group membership. This is based on the fact that the 
reference to groups appears not only in the chapeau (setting out the means rea), but also in 
the subsequent parts that determine the punishable acts of genocide. Since it is specified 
that these acts of genocide have to be performed against ‘members of the group’, it 
supposedly follows that a group has to exist in a real or objective sense.83 But, as Rebecca 
Young points out, it is not necessary to draw this conclusion from the text in Article 2:  
 
‘Once the existence of a protected group has been determined in the chapeau, regardless of 
whether the method of its identification is based on objective or subjective factors, that group 
then exists for the purpose of the definition. Any of the defined physical acts committed against 
the group would satisfy the actus reus element of the crime’.84  
 
This reading of the Convention seems the more reasonable one. The use of the word 
‘group’ does not automatically signify anything other than that where a protected group is 
found to exist, it can be committed genocide against by means of the acts mentioned in 
Article 2 (a)-(e). The conclusion is then that the Genocide Convention itself does not 
favour either the subjective or the objective approach to group identification, which 
leaves us to search for clarification elsewhere. 
 
Young goes on to examine the preparatory works to the Convention, and concludes that 
though it would seem that most states had an idea of groups as something to be 
determined by objective factors, there were also states that were open to subjective 
conceptions when determining groups. Much of the discussion among the states centred 
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around whether or not to include groups whose membership was of a voluntary nature, 
implying that the states considered groups to be a somewhat objective standard to be 
determined outside of the minds of the perpetrators or the victims85. The fact that the 
inclusion of racial groups, arguably the most objectively defined of the four categories, 
demanded very little discussion can also be seen as a sign that the drafters for the most 
part saw groups as objectively defined standards86. Several states, however, wanted to 
include groups that can necessarily only be defined subjectively, such as groups 
persecuted because of their opinions.87 
 
The opinion of individual state representatives during the discussion on the Convention 
does of course not answer the interpretative questions that arise after its conclusion. In 
addition, the discussions that Young cites from were not meant to address the question of 
group identification; the matter at hand was a different one88. Therefore, there is not 
much one can safely deduce from the opinions that surfaced during the discussion, or 
from the preparatory works in general. 
 
4.3 Group Identification in Genocide Case Law 
As with many interpretative questions of international law, it is the case law that yields 
the most information. When it comes to genocide, it is the ICTR and the ICTY that have 
had the most opportunities to address the various questions of interpretation that surface 
with the crime, and there are several cases before both tribunals where group 
identification has been a central issue. It is these judgements that are most often cited by 
commentators claiming that a subjective evolution is taking place’89 
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But is it really? Rebecca Young claims that though the tribunals may have changed their 
tune on the level of principle, they are still basing their practical decisions on group 
identification on the same factors as before – the difference being that these factors that 
were previously deemed to be objective ones are now being labelled, more accurately, as 
factors based on subjective perceptions.90 
 
4.3.1 Cases before the ICTR 
The first genocide case to be tried before the Tribunals was the Akayesu91 case, where the 
Trial Chamber had to deal with the difficult task of distinguishing between the Rwandan 
Tutsis and Hutus. Only if such a distinction could be made would the Tutsis, who were 
slaughtered en masse over the course of only a few months in 1994, be a protected group 
and the crime would be genocide. The Trial Chamber found it troublesome to decide 
which of the four possible groups the Tutsis could be considered as, and it is unclear 
whether they ended up labelling them as an ethnic group or whether they in reality went 
beyond the Convention’s definition of protected groups when they decided the Tutsis 
were protected because they were a ‘stable and permanent’ group92. For the purpose of 
the present analysis, it is not particularly significant to determine what the Trial Chamber 
really did; the stable and permanent approach (where the Convention should be 
considered to apply to any victim group that is stable and permanent, regardless of 
whether they could also be subsumed under one of the four categories of groups) has in 
any case not been endorsed in subsequent cases, and Tutsis were by other Trial Chambers 
considered to be an ethnic group. What is interesting with Akayesu are the types of 
evidence the Trial Chamber relied on to determine group identification. They used as 
evidence the existence of ‘an official classification system which permeates the legal 
system’93, and the fact that all the Rwandan witnesses that gave testimony to the tribunal, 
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whether Hutu or Tutsi, could answer the question of their own ethnic identity without any 
trouble. Their perception of each other’s and their own ethnical identity was very clear. In 
addition, the former Belgian colonizers too distinguished between the Hutus and the 
Tutsis without problems94. These factors were largely considered to be objective ones, 
and Akayesu is considered to be an example of an objective approach being used by the 
tribunal95. 
 
The Trial Chamber in Kayeshima and Ruzindana relied on the same type of evidence96, 
though that case has often later been typecast as evidencing a subjective approach97. And 
the Trial Chamber does say that an ethnic group could be ‘a group identified as such by 
others, including the perpetrators of the crime.’98 However, no matter what the Trial 
Chamber says, what it actually does is to rely on the same factors as in Akayesu; the 
national identity cards issued by the government and the testimony of victims99. 
 
In Rutaganda100 the Trial Chamber again emphasized the importance of the subjective 
perception of the perpetrators when it said that ‘membership [in an ethnic group] is … a 
subjective rather than an objective concept’101. But it also distanced itself from a purely 
subjective approach to group identification both by saying outright that a ‘subjective 
definition alone is not enough to determine victim groups’102, and by, at the level of 
practice, using the same type of evidence as the previous two cases. The Trial Chamber 
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then advised solving the issue using what Rebecca Young has named a ‘mixed approach’, 
taking into account ‘both the relevant evidence proffered and the political, social and 
cultural context.103’ A similar formula was repeated in the Bagilishema104 case, 
emphasizing that ‘[a]lthough membership of the targeted group must be an objective 
feature of the society in question, there is also a subjective dimension.’ The Bagilishema 
judgement identifies how a subjective approach can be useful when the existence of a 
protected group has been objectively settled: 
 
‘A group may not have precisely defined boundaries and there may be occasions when it is 
difficult to give a definitive answer as to whether or not a victim was a member of a protected 
group. Moreover, the perpetrators of genocide may characterize the targeted group in ways 
that do not fully correspond to conceptions of the group shared generally, or by other 
segments of society. In such a case, the Chamber is of the opinion that, on the evidence, if a 
victim was perceived by a perpetrator as belonging to a protected group, the victim could be 
considered by the Chamber as a member of the protected group, for the purpose of 
genocide.’105 
 
This mixed approach was once again reinforced and summed up by the Trial Chamber 
in Semanza106, saying that ‘[t]he various Trial Chambers of this Tribunal have … 
refer[ed] to the objective particulars of a given social or historical context, and by the 
subjective perceptions of the perpetrators. The Chamber finds that the determination of 
a protected group is to be made on a case-by-case basis, consulting both objective and 
subjective criteria.’107 This way of thinking about group determination has also received 
support in the legal literature108.  
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4.3.2 Cases before the ICTY 
There is more evidence of group identification being determined by the use of a 
subjective approach in the case law of the ICTY. Jelisic109 was the first case in which 
the ICTY considered these questions110, where the Trial Chamber notes that it would be 
a ‘perilous exercise’ to attempt to define national, ethnical or racial groups using 
objective criteria (in the judgement equated with ‘scientifically irreproachable criteria’). 
‘Therefore, it is more appropriate to evaluate the status of national, ethnical or racial 
group from the point of view of those persons who wish to single that group out from 
the rest of the community. The Trial Chamber consequently elects to evaluate 
membership in a national, ethnical or racial group using a subjective criterion.’111 And 
Rebecca Young concludes that, unlike in Akayesu, Kayeshima and Rutaganda where 
the subjective approach was also put forward as the preferred approach, a Trial 
Chamber for the first time relied on subjective evidence in the form of the perpetrator’s 
view of their victim’s group identity. The only objective evidence to be considered 
relevant by the Trial Chamber was the ‘statistical evidence that the victims were 
Muslim.’112 The subjective approach was also used in the Krstic113 case, though here 
the Trial Chamber also relied on evidence that the Bosnian Muslims were legally 
recognised as a group in the constitution (for this reason, Nersessian cites Krstic as an 
example of a case using the mixed approach114, as opposed to Young who characterize 
it as part of the subjective approach cases). But, notes Young,  
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‘any approach founded almost exclusively on the subjective regard of perpetrators has since 
been rejected by the Appeals Chamber in Stakic115, which notes that “the Krstic and Rutaganda 
Trial Judgements do not suggest that target groups may only be defined subjectively, by 
reference to the way which the perpetrator stigmatizes victims”’.  
 
She concludes that the ‘Jelisic approach of looking only to very minimal statistical 
objective evidence is anomalous’.116 
 
4.4 Concluding Remarks on Criteria of Group Identification 
After analysing the case law of the ad hoc tribunals, the picture being painted is no 
longer one of an evolution of the method of group identification from an objective to a 
subjective approach. As both Rebecca Young and David Nersessian note, though the 
tone of the arguments may have changed – though the tribunals have started talking 
about the possibility of relying solely on subjective factors – they are still in practice 
relying on the same types of evidence as they have from the very beginning of the time 
of genocide trials. What counts as evidence before the ad hoc tribunals, then and now, 
are factors like ‘objective evidence of contemporaneous legal recognition of groups, 
subjective evidence of the victims themselves and subjective evidence demonstrated 
through stigmatization by the perpetrators …’117. The change, or evolution, that some 
commentators are reporting might then be described better as a change in classification. 
The so-called objective factors utilized as evidence by the tribunals are not objective in 
the scientific sense – ‘they are themselves the product of social processes, informed by 
subjective social beliefs which have been transferred to a broader socio-legal 
context118’. Young points to the Rwandan identity cards that specified ethnicity as an 
example; they were treated as objective evidence of ethnicity by the ICTR, but the very 
divide between the Hutus, Tutsis and Twa that was the cause for the issuing of the 
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identity cards was a subjective perception of the Belgian colonizers in Rwanda. This 
subjective perception was ‘gradually accepted by Rwandans themselves and “hardened” 
into objective fact by virtue of the incorporation of these subjective beliefs into the 
social, legal and political systems’.119  
 
In the more recent case law, the tribunals are being more open about how these 
objective factors have a subjective basis:  
 
‘[m]embership of a group is a subjective rather than an objective concept … in a given 
situation, the perpetrator, just like the victim, may believe that there is an objective criterion for 
determining membership of an ethnic group on the basis of an administrative mechanism for the 
identification of an individual ethnic group.’120 
 
As Young rightly points out, when one enters into a closer analysis of objective and 
subjective factors, the distinction is difficult to uphold. Perhaps it would then be more 
useful to rephrase the question from concerning different types of evidence, to one more 
concerned with the timeline of group existence. To fulfil the object and purpose of the 
prohibition on genocide, the group in question would have to be have existed before the 
genocide. Only then would it have been able to offer the world its original contribution 
through ‘genuine traditions, genuine culture, and a well-developed national 
psychology.’121 The test could then be whether or not the subjective factors that indicate 
that this group exists had ‘hardened’ into objective facts before the time of the genocide, 
or whether, contrarily, it was the genocide itself that called the group into being.  
 
Thus it would seem that the so-called subjective evolution is an evolution of labels and 
language, and not a real shift in the way groups are being identified. Protected groups still 
do not find their identification based solely on the mind of the perpetrators. And while, as 
                                                
119 Young, ’How Do We Know Them When We See Them?’, 16 
120 ICTR Judgement, ’Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi’, Case No. ICTR-2001-64, Trial Chamber (17 June 
2004), §254, as quoted in Young, ’How Do We Know Them When We See Them?’, 16 
121 Lemkin, ’Axis Rule in Occupied Europe’, 91 
 38 
Young puts it, an increased reflection of social reality is immensely useful for the attempt 
of trying to bring together the legal and the popular understandings of genocide, it does 
not go as far as some commentators had hoped. It does not allow perpetrators of genocide 
to ‘think a group into being’, and thus the farmers and insurgents being killed in Darfur 
for being farmers and insurgents are still not victims of genocide – leaving the chasm 
between the legal and the popular definition of genocide intact.  
 
‘When we read about mass killings and rapes launched against civilian populations, we think 
that that is genocide. When, in addition, we are told that these killings amount to extermination, 
we know it is genocide. If the lawyers tell us that it is not genocide because the group is not 
being exterminated as such but only because they are insurgents, or farmers, we can only shake 
our heads at the obtuse casuistry of lawyers.’122 
 
What, then, lies at the heart of this divide? If the root cause cannot be found in an 
underdeveloped concept of group identification, what is causing it? The answer might lie 
in the importance of the label genocide, and a fundamental misunderstanding as to what it 
means. Why is it so important that the horrors of the Cambodian torture prison Toul 
Sleng is labelled genocide? Why did some states demand that Turkey had to acknowledge 
that genocide took place towards the Turkish Armenians if it wanted to join the EU?123 
And why do some commentators feel, in the aftermath of the Darfur Report, that the 
failure to use the label genocide on the Darfur atrocities represents a humiliation of the 
victims?124 In short, what really is in a name? 
                                                
122 Luban, ’Calling Genocide by Its Rightful Name’, 319 
123 BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4092933.stm 
124 ‘Because of this, the survivors of the violence in Darfur may face the further humiliation of 
being offered only paltry justice in the face of the magnitude of the “crime of crimes.’ John Hagan, 
Wenona Rymond-Richmond, and Patricia Parker. 2005. “The Criminology of Genocide: The Death 
and Rape of Darfur,” Criminology vol. 43, 525–61 
 39 
5 Broadening the Debate on the Concept of Genocide: What’s in a Name? 
5.1 International Crimes – a Pyramid of Evil or Different, but Equal? 
If genocide actually is the ‘crime of crimes’, then why wouldn’t the label be important? 
As Schabas notes, ‘the obvious suggestion [by the use of this phrase] is that genocide sits 
at the apex of a pyramid of criminalization, and that it is even more serious than the other 
“core crimes” of international criminal law, namely war crimes, crimes against humanity, 
and aggression’.125 His conclusion is clear, ‘genocide belongs at the apex of the 
pyramid.’126 If the meaning of the term genocide is that it is ‘the worst of the worst’, a 
crime more evil than the other international crimes, then it is no surprise that victims and 
commentators reacted the way they did when the crimes in Darfur were found to ‘fall 
short of genocide’.  
 
David Luban suggests that this is where it all goes wrong. Suggesting that the 
international crimes exist in a clear-cut hierarchy, instead of being distinct, but equal 
categories of crimes, arguably also hints at a corresponding ‘hierarchy of suffering’ on 
the side of the victims. Especially when differentating between genocide and crimes 
against humanity this kind of thinking will easily result in a very emotional response both 
from academics and the population in general when a case, like Darfur, is not labelled 
genocide. Schabas points to the difference between genocide and crimes against 
humanity and finds that ‘… genocide stands to crimes against humanity as premeditated 
murder stands to intentional homicide. Genocide deserves its title as the “crime of 
crimes”’127. With respect, this hierarchical distinction between genocide and crimes 
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against humanity misses the mark of what genocide is, as seen from a group pluralist 
point of view. 
 
‘From a group pluralist point of view, the concept of crimes against humanity fails precisely 
because it ignores the specific character of the target group, and the specific intention to 
diminish humanity by annihilating the group as such. To be sure, the crimes against humanity 
include a crime called “extermination”. But the legal definition, though it requires 
extermination committed in a planned, systematic attack, does not require a specific intent to 
exterminate, nor does it require the targeting of racial, ethnic, religious, or national groups “as 
such”. From Lemkin’s point of view, it misses the distinctive pluralist dimension of human 
value that genocide assaults.’128 
 
In other words, the difference between genocide and crimes against humanity in the form 
of extermination is not that one is intrinsically more evil or heinous than the other, but that 
genocide protects unique groups from disappearing from ‘the family of man’, focusing on 
the group character of the victims, while crimes against humanity protects any civilian 
group from atrocities, focusing on the group character of the perpetrators129. Arrogant as it 
may sound, the cause for the chasm between the popular and the legal conception of 
genocide is not the ‘obtuse casuistry of the lawyers’, but a popular misunderstanding about 
what genocide really is, and what values the prohibition on genocide is trying to protect. 
 
5.2 The Genocide Convention: The Root of the Confusion? 
Luban goes on to suggest that the root of this misunderstanding is how Lemkin’s idea of 
protection of group pluralism was translated into legal text in the Genocide Convention. 
The Convention weakened and distorted the definition in an attempt to make the crime of 
genocide prosecutable, thus losing it its inner consistency and coherence. According to 
Luban, Lemkin’s vision is compromised with the adding of the words ‘in whole or in part’ 
(emphasis added). Logically, a group that is destroyed only in part is a group that is not 
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completely destroyed, and as such is a group that still exists, in all its uniqueness, in the 
world. It’s still a terrible crime, but ‘it loses the special moral-philosophical quality that 
requires singling it out from all other mass killings and mass atrocities’.130 Luban points to 
the ICTR’s labelling of the Srebrenica massacre as genocide as an example131. Seven 
thousand Bosnian Muslims were killed; there was no plan to kill all Muslims, all Bosnian 
Muslims, or even all the Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica – they killed only men of military 
age. Yet killing these men, along with transferring the women, the children and the elderly 
out of the region, would in effect destroy the group (‘the group’ being the Bosnian Muslims 
of Srebrenica). This logic is reasonable enough. Even though the group Bosnian Muslims 
would still continue to exist, the Srebrenica enclave, with its traditions and culture, would 
not - or their way of life would at least be severely impaired.  
 
But the problem is that once a national group, like with the Srebrenica group, is understood 
to mean a ‘group-within-a-given-territory’132, genocide becomes very hard to distinguish 
from extermination as a crime against humanity. The crime against humanity in the form of 
extermination is in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Article 7.1 (b) 
defined as extermination committed as part of a ‘widespread or systematic attack directed 
against any civilian population’. The attack has to be part of a systematic and organized 
state policy; it cannot be an isolated event. And so, a massacre of a civilian group 
performed by perpetrators ‘in furtherance of’ a statal policy of extermination, in connection 
with other such acts committed in furtherance of the same goal, is a crime against 
humanity. If this civilian group can also be argued to be a group protected by the Genocide 
Convention, which with the phrase ‘in part’ allows for smaller parts of the group to be 
slated for destruction without the case then falling outside of the protective regime, then the 
two definitions begin to seem interchangeable. When groups connected to a government 
massacre a village, the situation on the ground arguably seems to be the same whether that 
village was slaughtered because they were part of an unwanted group, or just because of 
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some other political reason. Add to this that to many, the groups chosen for protection in 
the Genocide Convention seem arbitrary. If the villagers were singled out for destruction 
because they were part of a different economic class from the perpetrators, or were all 
communists who had banded together in a communal farming village, they would not be 
protected by the Convention. But if they were a Methodist village, they would be protected 
as a religious group. If they were the world’s first village consisting only of Esperanto-
speakers, they would (conceivably) be protected as an ethnic group. In these situations the 
results are all the same: A lot of civilian people are murdered for reasons other than who 
they (as individuals) are. Yet only the last two situations would be classified as cases of 
genocide; the crime of crimes, the darkest of the collective human soul. It is not hard to see 
why this would seem like a nonsensical distinction to some. 
 
‘The fact is that “extermination” means destroying a group, and it simply makes no sense to 
slice the metaphysical baloney so thin that there is a difference between an exterminative attack 
on a civilian population in a given territory and an intentional destruction of a group in that 
territory. They are two names of the same thing.’133 
 
While the frustration certainly is understandable, Luban’s analysis is not entirely 
convincing. There is a qualitative difference between attacking the very idea of group 
plurality – of attacking a group to wipe their specific influence from the world, erase them 
from the gene pool of humanity – and attacking a group because they, say, live in a 
strategically important place in an inter-statal power struggle, or are insurgents or political 
threats in another form. The results might end up seeming similar, but differentiating 
between crimes not by their results but by the reason they were committed is not unique to 
the crime of genocide.  
 
Though theoretically impaired, Lemkin’s vision is not fully compromised by the 
Convention’s ‘in part’ – Lemkin himself conceded that adding such a criterion would be 
absolutely necessary to make the crime prosecutable. First of all, people, even criminals 
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with utopian visions, are usually concerned with their own surroundings. Not many would 
plan to exterminate every member, worldwide, of a group. As Luban points out, not even 
Hitler had a plan (an actual plan) to rid the world of every Jew. Secondly, such plans, even 
if they existed, would be virtually impossible to prove. With ‘in part’, the drafters of the 
Convention made sure the perpetrators could be punished even if genocidal intent could 
only be proven with regard to parts of a group. And in a world of sovereign states, 
prosecution could prove troublesome when groups spread out over the territory of different 
states – another difficulty somewhat helped by adding ‘in part’ to the definition.  
 
Also, ‘in part’ has widely been understood to mean a significant part of the group in 
question. Lemkin understood ‘in part’ to mean a ‘substantial enough part to have an impact 
on the group as a whole’134. Applying this understanding to the criteria is logical. Targeting 
a group to the extent where a significant part is destroyed or in other ways have their living 
conditions ruined would, presumably, affect how the group as a whole develop. Exactly 
how large the part of the group would have to be to give the crime the label of genocide is 
unclear. The US Congress interpreted it to mean a substantial enough part ‘that its loss 
would make the group no longer viable within the nation’, but David Luban concludes, 
reasonably, that this is a much stronger criterion than the one Lemkin upheld.135 With the 
Srebrenica judgement, the ICTY seems to apply a criterion closer to Lemkin’s 
understanding than to that of the US Congress.  
 
5.3 The Problem of the ‘Crime of Crimes’ 
Even though it is true that Lemkin’s vision of genocide as an assault on group pluralism 
might lose some of its theoretical coherence when the destruction of a group ‘in part’ is 
added to the definition, that would not cause such a problem if one didn’t also add the 
perception of genocide as the ‘crime of crimes’ to the mix. If genocide is the worst of the 
worst, insisting on the legal definition of the word in the face of terrible atrocities seems 
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nothing but insulting and insensitive. To the survivors of Darfur, the message that the 
mass-slaughter fell short of genocide and was ‘just’ a crime against humanity must have 
seemed obscene. When lawyers explain that the killing of a Rwandan Tutsi is genocide, for 
sure, but the murder of the politically moderate Hutu standing next to him is not, they 
should perhaps not be surprised to be met with feelings of outrage. The popular 
understanding of genocide as the worst label the international community can put on a 
series of atrocities makes working with the definition in practice very difficult. There will 
always be a strong normative need to call these kinds of horrors by the worst name we have 
available. Roméo Dallaire’s recounts of his experiences in Rwanda may serve as a 
reminder of exactly how gruesome these situations are. 
 
‘My force was standing knee-deep in mutilated bodies, surrounded by the guttural moans of 
dying people, looking into the eyes of children bleeding to death with their wounds burning in 
the sun and being invaded by maggots and flies’.136 
 
When people are being slaughtered, language in general will seem unable to capture the 
horrors we witness and our feelings towards them, which will naturally give a need to 
‘stretch the Genocide Convention definition, often going beyond all reason, in order to fit 
particular atrocities within the meaning of Article 2 [of the Genocide Convention]’.137 But 
is this, arguably very understandable, emotional response reason enough to abandon the 
effort to pinpoint and uphold the uniqueness of genocide, and resist abolishing the 
differences between genocide and extermination? With the law lies the difficult 
responsibility of performing two tasks at once: Never to lose sight of the humanitarian 
aspects of the crime, while being able, at the same time, to look beyond them, to draw lines 
not based on emotions, but on rules and principles of law.  
 
Contenders of the ‘crime of crimes’ view on genocide have also had similar concerns about 
expanding the definition of genocide, though for different reasons. They worry about 
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abolishing the difference between extermination and genocide not because they are 
different concepts, protecting different values, and as such should be kept apart. They 
worry because it would risk trivializing the horror of genocide and weaken the stigma 
associated with the crime.138 This mode of thinking only works if one accepts genocide’s 
place at the top of the pyramid of horrors. Being convicted for crimes against humanity, at 
least the crime against humanity of extermination, need not hold any less stigma. 
Acknowledging that extermination is as serious as genocide does not necessarily take 
anything away from genocide as a concept.  
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6 The Road Ahead: Is the Definition of Genocide in Need of Revision? 
The conceptual chasm relating to genocide is indeed a problem, both in theory and in 
practice, because it detracts from the real challenge facing us: Preventing and stopping 
genocide. What, then, can be done about the situation? Many have called for a revision of 
the Genocide Convention, for about as many different reasons as there are commentators.  
 
Some want to alter the definition to make it more expansive; to include more groups, or to 
let the group-determination be done solely by the perpetrator (a fully subjective approach to 
group determination). Both of these solutions might in theory bring the legal definition of 
genocide closer to the popular understanding, thus helping to make the never-ending 
discussion of the genocide label unnecessary. David Luban presents a simple change to the 
definition of genocide that might take the definition a step in that direction. He suggests 
leaving the definition in the Convention as it is, except for one added feature.  
 
‘Genocide will still consist of five specific ways of destroying a protected group, with specific 
intent to destroy it, in whole or in part, as such. The change will simply be to append to this 
definition an additional seven-word clause: “or the crime against humanity of 
extermination”’139.  
 
He would thus have extermination as a crime against humanity count as genocide, 
removing the need to differentiate between them. If extermination was genocide, and 
would automate, when occurring, the same level of responsibility for states as genocide 
does today, there would be no need for the legalistic hair-splitting now taking place. One 
obvious criticism of Luban’s suggestion is that it is unlikely that it would clear up the 
                                                
139 Luban, ’Calling Genocide by Its Rightful Name’, 320 
 47 
conceptual misunderstanding. Turning extermination into genocide and vice versa would 
hardly make people more attuned to the values it is that genocide is to protect that 
extermination does not protect. Is that a message we are ready to give up on? 
 
Others believe the Convention would be best left unchanged, and that the fact that it 
captures only a limited number of atrocities, and by the same token leaves out a great deal, 
is one of its greatest strengths. Schabas contends that ‘for society to define a crime so 
heinous that it will occur only rarely is testimony to the value of such a precise formulation. 
Diluting the definition, either by formal amendment of its terms or by extravagant 
interpretation of the existing text, risks trivializing the horror of the real crime when it is 
committed.’140 – a comment that is echoed by others141. They caution against eradicating 
the difference between crimes against humanity and genocide because such a change would 
‘radically deprive the crime of genocide of its distinctiveness under international law.’142 
As Kress admits, such a change would be a perfectly allowable policy change, there is no 
formal hindrance to bringing the two concepts closer together, or even eradicating the 
difference between them completely, but it would impoverish the notion of international 
crimes.  
 
Another argument for leaving the Convention well alone is that opening treaty negotiations 
can be like opening the infamous Pandora’s Box. It would mean risking compromising the 
parts of the Convention that has merit, that are functional and has value. This is, of course, 
always a risk in the international ‘law-making process’.  
 
From a group-pluralist point of view, bringing more groups into the Convention’s 
protective regime might be a sensible step to achieving the objects and purposes of the 
Convention. The logic behind Lemkin’s idea of genocide was to protect the groups that 
make up the ‘family of man’. The four groups enumerated in the Conventions – racial 
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groups, national groups, ethnic groups and religious groups – are undoubtedly groups 
belonging to the overall make-up of humanity, but they are not the only groups that are in 
that position. Somewhat ironically, an intent to destroy humanity as a whole – to murder 
off humans as a group – would not be covered by the Genocide Convention. And other 
groups that are equally stable and permanent in nature as those mentioned in the text could 
also be included under the same logic, such as gender groups, groups of sexual orientation, 
economic groups and others. They share with the groups already mentioned in the 
Convention that they are often relatively clear-cut and easily identifiable in society, and 
group members have (or at least can have) something in common within the group, whether 
it’s cultural or biological, that gives them ‘special value over and above the aggregated 
value of their individual members’143. It would also not be easy for members of such 
groups to distance themselves from the group. This is obviously true of gender groups, but 
economic classes too are often stable and recognisable. The bourgeois can’t stop being 
bourgeois by choice. The hot potato in the debate on adding more groups, is political 
groups. The discussion on political genocide is heated and expansive, and I will not 
comment on it here any more than to recommend that the decision on inclusion or 
exclusion – when it comes to any groups, new or old – should be made with Lemkin’s idea 
of group-plurality in mind.  
 
If the problem is that genocide is by the population in general viewed as a form of 
extermination, and that this leads to emotional outrage when faced with the legal definition 
of the crime, then two solutions would seem to reveal themselves: Correct the definition of 
genocide to reflect the popular understanding; stop distinguishing between extermination 
and genocide in the Convention. Or explain the difference; start talking more about 
extermination as a crime – a legal construct much less known to the layman than genocide. 
If it is ever to be met with anything but outrage that a given mass atrocity crime is not a 
genocide proper, it has to be known that there is another label in existence that 
acknowledges the actual horrors of the crime just as well. Only then can the label 
‘genocide’ be left to be applied only to those cases where it belongs: when the protection of 
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groups as such is at stake. Bringing about such a clarification in the atrocity-discourse 
would hopefully mean that not labelling a case genocide would not be, as it regrettably 
often is now, an excuse to wash our collective hands of all responsibility – a ‘convenient 
linguistic excuse for doing nothing.’144 If ‘genocide’ is to be a workable legal term, a crime 
that can be persecuted and perpetrators punished for, then it cannot be the only category of 
crimes that ‘magically’ forces the actors on the international arena to take responsibility. 
As long as it is, how can one defend not ‘torturing the language of the Genocide 
Convention’145 to fit as many cases into its definition as at all possible? Language and legal 
terms work best if they are applied honestly, and reflect the reality they are meant to 
describe. There is a need to start the conversation of how we are to talk about mass atrocity 
crimes, and jurists are well equipped to be a part of that conversation.  
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